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THE AUTONOMOUS GLOBAL CORPORATION:
ON THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL LAW BEYOND

ASSET PARTITIONING AND LEGAL PERSONALITY
Larry Catd Backer*

I.

INTRODUCTION

What is the essential role of the law of economic organizations? 1 A definitive
answer to this simple question has proven to be elusive. In the last century, the debate
was framed in terms of the relationship of law to corporate personality:
There is a vast literature, with deep roots in nineteenth-century German scholarship,
on the nature of juridical persons. The debate over competing conceptions of juridical
persons that is the central preoccupation of that literature still shows some life today, in
terms not much removed from those of a century ago.... [T]he traditional literature is
principally concerned with questions-such as the
power of the state versus the power of
2
private organizations, or the nature of group will.
At the core of the "juridical personality" debate were two basically incompatible
views, each held by a different camp, of the critical nature of economic organizations.
For one camp, economic organizations were property in the hands of their owners. This
property might be given special qualities by the state or through contract, but it remained
property all the same. 3 It followed from this conceptual framework that the role of law
was to focus on the interests of the owners or, more generally, those with an ownership

* Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University. The author may be contacted at Icbl I@psu.edu.
Many thanks to Professor Barbara Bucholtz for the invitation to participate in this symposium. I am grateful to
my research assistant Christian Moffitt (Penn State '07) for his excellent research assistance.
1. Economic organizations include-in addition to corporations, partnerships, and other formally
constituted collectives-a number of new forms of collective economic activity. These new forms include
networks and other informal aggregations of economic activity. See Gunther Teubner, The Many-Headed
Hydra: Networks as Higher-OrderCollective Actors, in Corporate Control and Accountability: Changing
Structures and the Dynamics of Regulation 41 (Joseph McCahery, Sol Picciotto & Colin Scott eds., Clarendon
Press 1993).
2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of OrganizationalLaw, 110 Yale L.J. 387,
438-39 (2000) (footnote omitted); see also Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the
Corporation,21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1061 (1994).
3. See e.g. Victor Morawetz, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Other Than Charitable2
(Little, Brown & Co. 1882) (arguing that the existence of a corporation independent of its owners was fiction,
namely "the rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the persons
who compose it, and not of an imaginary being"); 1.Maurice Wormser, Disregardof the CorporateFiction and
Allied CorporationProblems 8 (Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1927) ("A reality the corporation is. A personality the
corporation is not.").

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 41 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 8
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:541

interest or stake in the entity. 4 For the other camp, the economic organization, like a
pallid reflection of the political state that gave it existence, constituted an autonomous
institutional actor separable from those with an interest in it. 5 From this framework, the
role of law should focus on the entity-that is, on the collective interests constituting the
entity rather than on the aggregate individual interests of stakeholders, however defined.6
The last half of the twentieth century witnessed the revitalization of this debate,
now heavily infused with notions borrowed from economics. 7 For these scholars, the
issues of institutional personality were tangential and largely 'irrelevant to the
foundational realities of institutional functioning. The focus of these explorations was on
the role of economic institutions as a nexus point for the interests of others. 8 In a variety
of substantially more sophisticated methods that deepened the insights of economicorganization-as-property proponents of the earlier debate, 9 this scholarship focused on
the role of law as a facilitator of natural profit-maximizing behavior among the actors
pooling resources within an organization. 10 Recent scholarship has suggested the
connection between the two camps and the critical role that economic culture plays in the
social acceptance of institutional personality.ll The great insight of this scholarship has
been to see in Japanese economic institutional culture evidence of the possibility that a
12
corporation can own itself and thus become a self-determining subject.
Another strain of recent economic-organization-as-nexus-of-contract scholarship
has focused on the singular characteristic of limited liability as a basis for understanding
the role of regulation of economic enterprises. This scholarship, too, views institutional

4. The debate over the nature and extent of the actors whose interests ought to be protected is extensive,
protracted, and unresolved. The class of actors whose interests or "stakes" in the enterprise ought to be
protected range from shareholders to virtually any person or entity affected by enterprise activity. Compare
e.g. Milton Friedman, Capitalismand Freedom 133-34 (U. Chi. Press 1962) with e.g. Robert A. Dahli, After the
Revolution? Authority in a Good Society 80-87, 100-02 (rev. ed., Yale U. Press 1990).
5. German academic theory developed this idea to its highest form. See Otto Gierke, PoliticalTheories of
the Middle Age (Frederic William Maitland trans., Beacon Press 1958); Gunther Teubner, Enterprise
Corporatism:New IndustrialPolicy and the "Essence" of the Legal Person, 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 130 (1988).
American courts and scholars for the most part tended to avoid the extreme. For a discussion of the American
perspective, see Phillip I. Blumberg, The MultinationalChallenge to CorporationLaw: The Searchfor a New
CorporatePersonality21-51 (Oxford U. Press 1993).
6. Phillips, supra n. 2, at 1097.
7. See e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law
(Harv. U. Press 1991). For a discussion of the power of this discourse in the United States, see David Sciulli,
CorporatePower in Civil Society: An Application ofSocietal Constitutionalism61-128 (NYU Press 2001).
8. Among the mountain of writings on this point, see e.g. William W. Bratton, Jr., The "'Nexus of
Contracts" Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407 (1989).
9. See e.g. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv.L.
Rev. 1911 (1996).
10. For an example of an early but influential work, see Ralph K. Winter, Government and the Corporation
(Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research 1978).
11. See Katsuhito lwai, Persons, Things and Corporations:The CorporatePersonality Controversy and
Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 583, 594 (1999) (comparing the consequences of
corporate personality cultures in Japan and the United States to examine the ways in which it is possible "to
eliminate either personality or thingness from the person-cum thing corporation, thereby turning it into a mere
'legal thing' or a full 'legal person,' respectively").
12. Id. at 597-600. Iwai notes that the possibility of self-ownership is possible even under regimes that
prevent corporations from exercising the rights of a shareholder with respect to its own shares. All that is
required is for a group of corporations to own a majority of each other's shares as a group. See also Meir
Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons,and Organizations:A Legal Theoryfor BureaucraticSociety (U. Cal. Press 1986)
(noting the possibility of a personless or ownerless corporation).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss3/8

2

Backer: The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational
2006]

THE A UTONOMOUS GLOBAL CORPORATION

concerns as largely tangential to the appropriate focus. Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman recently argued "the essential role of all forms of organizational law is to
provide for the creation of a pattern of creditors' rights-a form of 'asset partitioning'that could not practicably be established otherwise." 13 Organizational law creates
dedicated pools of assets in a much more efficient and cost-effective manner than other
14
areas of the law, particularly those of contracts, property, and security interests.
Asset partitioning protects the assets of an owner of a legal entity from the entity's
creditors and, more importantly, protects the entity's assets from its owner's personal
creditors. 15 For Hansmann and Kraakman, the focus on the legal regulation of asset
segregation offers "a definition of juridical persons that is simpler, clearer, and more
functional than those that have characterized the traditional literature. Indeed, one
reason we have used the term 'legal entity' rather than 'juridical person' is to avoid
' 16
confusion between our analysis and the more traditional views."
For all their utility, these approaches to the relationship of law and economic
entities are limited by different sets of analytical constraints. The corporate personality
debate has focused on the relationship between entity and owner. The economicentity-as-nexus-of-contract debate has focused on the relationship between aggregations
of capital and stakeholders. Implicit in these analyses is the idea that law is an
exogenous force that regulates the relationship between entity and shareholder in the one
case and entity and creditor in the other.
This critical, but limiting, assumption actually consolidates two related principles.
The first is the territorial principle. This principle is predicated on the idea that
economic entities are wholly regulated within a single territory. The second is the
principle of hierarchy of regulatory authority. In these analyses, this principle is
expressed as an assumption that every political community has regulatory power
independent of and superior to the power of the entity regulated or the individuals who
have aggregated resources. Combining the two principles produces a set of limitations
on the ways in which people, capital, stakeholders, and the enterprise relate to and can be
affected by law. In its most essential form, it suggests a classical model in which
political states form closed regulatory systems subject to an exclusive regulation by a set
of singular political institutions superior in power to and separable from the people and
things these political institutions regulate.
The emerging patterns of economic globalization 17 may expose the limitations of
18
theorizing that is grounded on these principles. The rise of multinational enterprises

13. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 390 (footnote omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 439.
17. See Manfred B. Steger, Globalism: The New Market Ideology (Bowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
2002). For a critical analysis of economic globalization, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its
Discontents (W.W. Norton & Co. 2002).
18. The definition of such enterprises is unsettled. See Peter T. Muchlinski, MultinationalEnterprisesand
the Law 61-80 (Blackwell Publishers 1999). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") has used a loose definition that will serve for purposes of this article. See OECD, OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises: Revision 2000, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (accessed
June 25, 2006) [hereinafter OECD, Guidelines]. The OECD defines such enterprises as:
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suggests the old assumptions about state monopolies on lawmaking and on the hierarchy
of that law, and regulatory authority may no longer be useful as a limiting parameter for
analysis. 19 The character of law as an exogenous force is increasingly belied by an
emerging global economic system in which many have suggested "no one is in
charge." 2° In a globalizing world, the territorial principle produces a perverse effectlimiting, rather than expanding, the importance of law as a force in the regulation of
economic enterprises or of those with an interest in them. Likewise, globalization limits
the value of traditional legal hierarchy as a descriptive or predictive tool. It is
increasingly replaced by a principle of hierarchy of authority that suggests the state may
not be the ultimate source for either law or coercion of behavior-transnational or
international systems may now or in the future rise to supplant the state as the regulatory
nexus point with multinational economic enterprises.
This is not to suggest that the insights of the older analyses have lost all value.
Quite the opposite-the insights of academics like Katsuhito Iwai, Hansmann, and
Kraakman are not merely important within the context in which they were written, but
may now serve as the means for beginning an exploration of a larger puzzle. Hansmann
and Kraakman's insights on "asset partitioning" and Iwai's insights about capitalist
models and their effects on the character of economic enterprises suggest important
insights on the problem of the multinational corporation and its regulatory nexus.
Those insights, when combined with those of the territorial principle and the principle of
hierarchy of regulatory authority, and understood in a context of economic globalization,
provide a more useful framework for examining what may be the central issue of
enterprise regulation-global institutional autonomy.
This article serves as an introduction to the construction of a theory of institutional
autonomy from a century of debate about the nature of economic entities. Part II
re-examines the asset partitioning ideas of Hansmann and Kraakman in the context of the
multinational enterprise. It suggests that asset partitioning can be usefully understood as
fleshing out the contours of the way in which organizational law shapes enterprise
autonomy for creditors. Part III re-examines the corporate personality analysis of Iwai in
a global context to suggest the possibility of enterprise autonomy from shareholders.
Part IV considers the perverse utility of the ancient territorial principle and the principle
of regulatory hierarchy in their global context to suggest the possibility of enterprise
autonomyfrom the state. Putting these puzzle pieces together, the article concludes with
the suggestion that the nexus of multinational enterprises and globalization provides a

[E]ntities established in more than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their
operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a
significant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise
may vary widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or
mixed.
Id. at 17-18.
19. See Larry CatA Backer, MultinationalCorporations,TransnationalLaw: The UnitedNations' Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in
InternationalLaw, 37 Colum. Hum. Rights L. Rev. 287 (2006).
20. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree 112 (Anchor Bks. 2000) (emphasis omitted).
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foundation for the
economic enterprises.

emergence

II.

of self-conscious,

autonomous,

self-regulating

ASSET PARTITIONING AND BEYOND

Hansmann and Kraakman have sought to find in asset partitioning the object of
organizational law. They start bS, evaluating business entities, particularly corporations,
as a metaphorical and literal nexus of contracts. 2 1 A firm must possess two qualities to
act successfully as such a nexus: "well-defined decision making authority" and the
' 22
ability "to provide assurance that the firm will perform its contractual obligations.
Firms satisfy the latter requirement by creating a distinct pool of assets that is separate
and protected from the personal creditors of the firm's owners. 23 To be recognized as
effective legal entities, firms must possess these characteristics, which are inherent to
individuals. 24 The authors argue that the defining characteristic of these legal entities
and, thus, contract law is the partitioning "of assets in which creditors of the firm itself
have a prior security interest.' '25 This asset partitioning provides "important efficiency
advantages in the creation of large firms that... would generally be
infeasible.., without organizational law," and the ability to partition assets "is the only
26
essential contribution that organizational law makes to commercial activity."
The defining feature of a firm is its ability to separate the assets of the firm and the
27
personal assets of the firm's managers.
"Asset partitioning has two [essential] components." 28 First, a pool of assets that
is distinct from the personal assets of the firm's owners and managers must be created.2 9
Second, a priority of creditors within these distinct pools of assets must be assigned.3 °
Within the second component of asset partitioning, two separate forms of asset
partitioning arise.3 1 Hansmann and Kraakman term the first form of asset partitioning

"'affirmative' asset partitioning," and it is this form that is the most important function of
organizational law. 32 Affirmative asset partitioning involves assigning "to the firm's
creditors a claim on the assets associated with the firm's operations that is prior to the
claims of the personal creditors of the firm's owners." 33 The "affirmative asset
partitioning that we see in the business corporation can be termed 'priority with
liquidation protection,"' which assigns the corporation's creditors prior claim on
corporate assets and protects the corporation from forced liquidation if a shareholder

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 391.
Id.at 392.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 393.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 393 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 393.
Id.
Id.
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becomes insolvent. 34 There are weaker forms of asset partitioning, such as that found in
general partnerships, in which a creditor can force liquidation. 35 Other legal entities,
36
such as trusts, provide for even stronger forms of affirmative asset partitioning.
Hansmann and Kraakman fold traditional notions of limited liability into what they
37
describe as "defensive asset partitioning," also known as traditional limited liability.
Defensive asset partitioning involves "granting to the owners' personal creditors a claim
on the owners' separate personal assets that is prior to the claims of the firm's
creditors." 38 There are several levels of defensive asset partitioning-some strong, some
weak. 39 The strongest type is the standard business corporation, in which the "creditors
' 4°
of the firm have no claim at all upon the personal assets of the firm's shareholders.
A weaker form would, again, be the general partnership, in which "partnership creditors
share equally with the creditors of the individual partners [when either becomes]
41
insolvent."
Turning back to affirmative asset partitioning, Hansmann and Kraakman
enumerate a number of benefits that arise from organizational law's ability to shield the
assets of a firm from the personal creditors of individual owners. 4 2 First, affirmative
asset partitioning reduces monitoring costs and lowers the cost of business contracting by
allowing owners to subpartition assets within a corporation through the creation of
subsidiaries. 4 3 The authors discuss two hypothetical scenarios: (1) two different types of
businesses are held as two operating divisions of one corporation, and (2) the same two
44
businesses organized as two separate corporations under one parent holding company.
Because these two businesses rely on two very different groups of creditors, the second
scenario will be preferable for a number of reasons. 45 First, the creditors, who are only
46
familiar with Business A, do not have to concern themselves about Business B.
47
Second, unexpected developments in one business will not negatively affect the other.
The authors concede that there are extra costs to subincorporation; for example, formal
48
bankruptcy proceedings are more likely to arise as asset pools become smaller.
Also, the risk of potential opportunism by the debtor increases. 49 The cost of credit to
50
these businesses will only be reduced if the benefits outweigh the above costs.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.at 394.
Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 395.
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supran. 2, at 395-96.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at401.
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Next, Hansmann and Kraakrnan posit that affirmative asset partitioning reduces
costs because it "eliminates much of the risk that a firm's finances will be affected by
51
unrelated changes in the personal and business affairs of its owners."
Asset partitioning becomes more important when a firm has numerous owners, as is the
case with large-scale, publicly traded corporations. 52 Without affirmative asset
partitioning, a firm's creditors would need to monitor not only the corporation's
credit-worthiness but also the financial stability of each of the firm's individual
stockholders. 53 Moreover, each individual owner would bear the cost and effort of
monitoring every other owner's personal financial situation because they ultimately bear
the cost of the firm's credit. 54 Organizational law creates a default rule that eliminates
55
these extra monitoring costs, thus making the cost of credit much lower.
Additionally, affirmative asset partitioning offers protection for the firm's creditors
and owners from the possibility of liquidation by the personal creditors of the firm's
owners.5 6 Strong form asset partitioning, in particular, lowers monitoring costs because
creditors and owners do not have to monitor the affairs of every shareholder in fear of
liquidation. 57 Affirmative asset partitioning also effectively allocates any risk to owners
and creditors in proportion to their costs of bearing the risk.5 8
Using this normative construct, Hansmann and Kraakman analyze whether it
would be feasible to construct various forms of business models without using
organizational law. 59 Beginning with single owner businesses, the authors note that
organizational law would allow an individual to partition his personal assets from those
of the business, and vice versa, quite easily. 60 First, the authors analyze whether the
individual could effectively obtain asset partitioning through contract. 6 1 While asset
partitioning may be technically possible, the transaction costs would be tremendous
because the individual would have to contract with each and every past, present, and
future personal and business creditor to ensure that one set of assets would not be
available to a different set of creditors. 6 2 The virtual impossibility of obtaining these
guarantees would create a "moral hazard" in which the individual is motivated to avoid
subordination agreements, especially where the agreements would be most significant to
the creditors of the business. 63 "By failing to obtain a subordination agreement with a
personal creditor, the entrepreneur and the personal creditor can externalize to the
entrepreneur's business creditors a larger portion of the potential costs of the

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 403.
Id.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 402-03.
Id. at401.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 406-07.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.
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entrepreneur's insolvency than the business creditors had bargained for. '64 Additionally,
partitioning if the arrangement is
the individual should only pursue an avenue of asset
65
parties.
all
to
beneficial
ultimately
and
both efficient
The potential hazards that exist with the single owner enterprise are compounded
at an exponential rate for each additional owner. 66 All owners would have to obtain
subordination agreements for past, present, and future personal creditors, and, again,
each individual would have substantial incentive to shirk this responsibility. 6 7 The costs
asset partitioning through contract would be
of obtaining affirmative
68
incredibly prohibitive.
Next, Hansmann and Kraakman turn to liquidation protection, which would be
difficult to obtain under basic property law, in which "[e]ach co-tenant of property held
as tenancy in common has a right to force partition of the property. ' 69 Theoretically,
bankrupt tenant could force partition if they stepped into the
creditors of the
70
tenant's shoes.
The authors are less confident about the possibility of transferring ownership of the
assets of the business to an independent manager, who would be bound by contract to act
as an "agent for the owners, manage the assets for the exclusive benefit of the owners
' 71
,
and to reconvey the assets to the owners under appropriate circumstances. 72
creditors.
This would protect the business creditors from the owners' personal
However, this would merely shift the problems found under the single ownership
who would have the same incentive not to acquire
enterprise to the manager,
73
subordination agreements.
Finally, Hansmann and Kraakman attempt to fashion a basis for the regulation of
business organizations by supplementing contract law with the law of security
interests.74 Essentially, they find that the law of security interests does not create a
strong form of liquidation protection because "in their contemporary form, [security
class of creditors from
interests do not] offer a means of preventing one or another
75
claim."
their
of
satisfaction
in
assets
the
of
forcing liquidation
Turning back to defensive asset partitioning, Hansmann and Kraakman examine
the benefits of traditional limited liability to business organizations. 76 First, they argue
that limits on liability create monitoring economies like those generated by affirmative
77
asset partitioning by allowing personal creditors to focus on one set of assets.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.at410.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 410.
Id.at411.
Id.at410.
Id.at411.
Id.at 411-12.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 414.
Id.
Id.at415.
Id. at417.
Id.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n.2, at 423.
Id.at424.
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Second, defensive asset partitioning reduces the cost of firm governance by ensuring that
78
all owners experience the same proportional gains and losses from the firm's policies.
Third, asset partitioning reduces governance costs by shifting the burden of monitoring
the firm's managers from the owners to the creditors. 79 Fourth, limited liability lowers
the cost of "securing and collecting personal judgments against the personal assets of the
firm's owners." 80 Fifth, limited liability facilitates the transfer of ownership by allowing
owners to separate corporate liabilities from their own. 8 1 Finally, defensive asset
partitioning provides for risk sharing by splitting the liabilities of the 82
corporation from
the owners and by splitting the liabilities of the owners from each other.
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that organizational law is not as essential to
83
creating defensive asset partitioning as it is to affirmative asset partitioning.
Theoretically, without organizational law, defensive asset partitioning would take the
form of unlimited joint and several liability, as it does in the general partnership model. 84
To achieve defensive asset partitioning, the partnership interest would have to obtain
85
agreements from creditors that would prevent an attack on the owners' personal assets.
Acquiring such agreements may increase transaction costs substantially, but there is
historical precedent for such a model.8 6 As business law evolved, courts came to
recognize and honor limited liability clauses that joint-stock companies inserted into
creditor agreements. 8 7 Organizational law would lower transaction costs, but firms can
88
feasibly obtain defensive asset partitioning through the law of contracts.
Having established that affirmative asset partitioning is an essential function of
organizational law, Hansmann and Kraakman finally turn to whether organizational law
serves other functions. 89 They find that organizational law facilitates contracting with
creditors through other provisions, such as the assignment of property claims among
creditors.
Organizational law also "regulates relations among the owners of a firm and
relations between the firm's owners and its managers." 9 1 This easily can be handled
through boilerplate contracts, particularly fiduciary duties. 92 "Absent such explicit
contracting, the law of agency" can also handle these issues. 93 Additionally,
transferability of contractual rights and duties is possible if all contracting parties
expressly agree, which would be burdensome. 94 Organizational law provides a way

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 425-26.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 426.
Id. at 426-27.
Id.at 429.
Id.
Id. at 429-30.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supran. 2, at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 432.
Id. at 433.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 433.
Id.at 434.
Id.
Id.
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around that. 95 Finally, withdrawal rights can be established without resorting to
organizational law; however, standard property law prohibits unlimited agreements not
to partition. 96 This actually raises a potential third form of asset partitioning: protecting
the owners from liquidation by other owners. But Hansmann and Kraakman only gloss
97
over this potential benefit of organizational law.
The authors conclude that traditional analysis, even traditional economic analysis
of corporate law, misperceive the foundations of organizational law. For them, it is not
contractual webs of relationships in self-defining systems that accurately reflect the
realities of organizational behavior. Rather, the ability to define the property rights over
98
which participants in a firm can contract is the defining function of organizational law.
Organizational law is essentially property law-not contract law. Without organizational
law, large organizations could not be created effectively. 9 9 But what, exactly, does that
mean for large organizations?
Reaction to Hansmann and Kraakman's asset partitioning article, at least among
those who have considered their arguments, has been positive. Scholars have not only
accepted the authors' asset partitioning article in light of organizational law but have
attempted to apply asset partitioning to an array of disciplines from bankruptcy law100 to
agency law. 101 Lynn Stout agrees that the primary defining characteristic of a
corporation is asset partitioning but argues that the end reason for this is not to protect
creditors' rights, as Hansmann and Kraakman claim. 10 2 Instead, she argues that asset
partitioning encourages "capital lock-in," where investors irretrievably invest their
capital within a corporation. 10 3 Stout believes that the "new school" view of the
corporation as an asset partition will dominate scholarship but that scholars should use
the theory to explore other questions, such as board governance. 104 Similarly, Margaret
Blair notes the importance of asset partitioning between the organization and
shareholder, which prevents liquidation of the corporation. 105
Still, some scholars have suggested weaknesses in the theory.
Although
affirmative asset partitioning or entity shielding are necessarily prior to defensive asset
partitioning within the theoretical model, empirical evidence demonstrates that historical
analysis of the evolution of corporate forms does not allow for proper predictions of
future organizational evolution. 106 Per Samuelson analyzes the historical and modem
development of Swedish business organizations and finds that historical analysis alone is

95. Id.
96. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 434-35.
97. Id. at 435.
98. Id. at 440.
99. Id.
100. Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 69 (2004).
101. Robert B. Thompson, Agency Law andAsset Partitioning,71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1321 (2003).
102. Lynn A. Stout, On the Natureof Corporations,2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 253, 254 (2005).
103. Id. at 255 (citing Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizersin the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387, 388-89 (2003)).
104. Id. at 266-67.
105. Blair, supra n. 103.
106. Per Samuelson, On the Evolution of CorporateForms, 2005 U. I11.L. Rev. 15, 29 (2005).
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insufficient to predict modem business trends. 10 7 Samuelson argues that "a careful
investigation as to what jural relations (rights, duties, liabilities, and so on)"'1 8 related to
asset partitioning must be conducted to strengthen Hansmann and Kraakman's theory.
My sense is that Stout is onto something-but not necessarily the "something" on
which she would have us focus. Asset partitioning does more than provide a default rule
for defining property rights in enterprise property. The property rights defined have a
particular vector. That vector is clearly targeted in the direction of protecting the
integrity of the assets aggregated in the entity. This is so whether one views the
protection as flowing to the individuals who own the entity or to the entity itself. Either
way, the protection is tied to the aggregation of capital within the entity.
In this sense, at least, what Hansmann and Kraakman identify is a significant
component of autonomy in the enterprise itself. Asset partitioning theory acts to do two
things that further entity autonomy. It suggests, first, that a self-contained (or
containing) vessel must exist into which assets can be segregated and, second, that assets
and other things of value can be segregated within and placed beyond the direct reach of
people with an interest in the entity. Older notions of entities as pass-through
emphasized the direct relationship between owner and the aggregation of assets owned.
But strengthening asset partitioning also strengthened the possibility of entity autonomy
at the expense of direct control by the shareholder. More importantly, it provided a
single institutional shield for assets aggregated by a collective. When combined with the
idea of the independence of juridical personhood, it provided a means to disperse assets
in a way that protected them from creditor and owner alike. An entity that can disperse
assets and other things of value among other entities it owns or controls can significantly
enhance its operation as a unit independent of its owners or those with interests in its
09
assets, such as creditors and other stakeholders.1
For all of its potential, one of the most striking limitations about the analysis of
Hansmann and Kraakman is its fidelity to the principle of territoriality. Underlying the
analysis is an unquestioned assumption that there must exist a one-for-one
correspondence between entity, assets, creditors, and the regulating community.
Hansmann and Kraakman have little to say about the objective of law or even the
appropriate classification of organizational law in which any one of the critical factors of
the analysis straddles political borders. Alternatively, Hansmann and Kraakman may
make the assumption that a one-for-one correspondence exists-irrespective of the
location of assets, entity, and creditors-because the regulation of asset partition would,
at least at some level of generality, be uniform across regulating states. But that cannot
be true. 10 Where assets are dispersed among a variety of jurisdictions, which have
different approaches; where creditors are dispersed; or where entities are divided or their

107. Id. at 24-28.
108. Id.at 29 (emphasis omitted).
109. See Sandra K. Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil among Affiliated Companies in the European
Community and in the U.S.: A Comparative Analysis of U.S., German, and U.K. Veil-Piercing Approaches,
36 Am. Bus. L.J. 73, 84-95 (1998).
110. Thus, for example, it would be difficult to suggest that the asset partition rules of China, Saudi Arabia,
or Cuba conform to the model on which Hansmann and Kraakman's analysis rests. See e.g. Hansmann &
Kraakman, supra n. 2, at 393-98.
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operations dispersed across political jurisdictions, it is not clear what asset partitioning
tells us for purposes of organization law. In this respect, at least, asset partitioning
theory, standing alone, does not help much.
III.

THE AUTONOMOUS CORPORATION AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS BEYOND THE STATE

The most interesting recent work on enterprise personality has its sources well
away from the United States. Iwai, in particular, has explored the nature of the
relationships possible between an entity and its owners. His work is particularly
important here for two insights. The first is the idea that, even within free market
systems, the character of enterprises can vary according to the enterprise culture of the
state in which such entities (and ownership in such entities) are regulated. The second is
the idea that among the variants possible is one in which entities can exist free of a direct
connection to their owners-that is, that an entity can own itself.
Iwai argues that a corporation is neither truly a person nor a thing but a unique
amalgamation of the two because it has the propensity to both own and be owned.1 11
The corporation owns all of the assets of the corporation, which only a legal person
can do; however, unlike natural people, who cannot be owned, the corporation is owned
by shareholders. 112 The essence of a corporation, according to Iwai, is its function as a
coordinator of "complex contractual relations between inside shareholders and outside
113
parties by directly entering into contracts with the latter on behalf of the former."
Iwai emphasizes that he views the corporation, not as a nexus of contracts, but as a thing
owned by shareholders that has the capacity to fully participate in contractual
relationships as the holder of corporate assets. 114 Asset partitioning, both positive and
negative, necessarily emerges from the corporation's person/thing dual nature because if
the corporation is the sole holder of corporate assets, the converse must also be true: the
115
shareholder's assets are also "separate and distinct" from those of the corporation.
Iwai focuses on the corporation's person/thing duality-that a corporation acting
as a person can own other corporations and, in turn, can be property owned by other
corporations. 1 16
Since 1889, when New Jersey legalized holding companies,
corporations both inside and outside of the United States have bought and sold the shares
of other corporations for merger and investment purposes. 117 For Iwai's purposes, the
traditional holding company falls short, though, because dominant shareholders who are
flesh-and-blood human beings control any holding company. 118 The corporation, even
as entity, remains primarily a thing in the hands of its ultimate shareholders.
In theory, a corporation could buy back its own shares held by third parties and
then become its own controlling shareholder and, thus, almost a full-person that is

111. Iwai, supra n. 11, at 589-90.
112. Id. at 589.
113. Id.at 590.
114. Id. at 591.
115. Id.
116. Iwai, supra n. 11, at 597.
117. Id. at 598.
118. Id. (arguing "[n]onetheless, the holding company still falls short of shedding its thingness entirely,
because it has its own dominant shareholders watching over it").

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss3/8

12

Backer: The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Organizational

2006]

THE A UTONOMOUS GLOBAL CORPORATION

capable of self-determination. 119 Most countries prohibit these sort of corporate
buybacks, so "in the real economy ...it appears impossible for a corporation to become
its own owner." 120 A more realistic scenario emerges initially when one posits that one
corporation, Corporation A, owns all of the shares of another corporation, Corporation B,
who in turn owns all of the shares of Corporation A. 12 1 This "cross-shareholding"
allows each corporation to essentially own itself through the other corporation and shed
itself of shareholder control. 122 While many countries still have laws against
cross-ownership as outlined above, Iwai hypothesizes that it would be entirely possible
for twelve corporations to individually acquire five percent of each others company's
shares but none of its own.123 The majority of each corporation's shareholders would be
the other corporation's, effectively ending the domination of the human shareholder over
any of the corporations. 124 While flesh-and-blood human beings still technically control
the corporation, human ownership becomes doubly removed from directorial
governance. Even assuming that corporate directors remain bound by a fiduciary duty
directly to shareholders (as an aggregate body) and not to the corporation (as an entity),
the will of the shareholders is now effectively that reflected by the aggregate of the
cross-holding corporations, each of which in turn is directed by its own board. The circle
is complete. 125 The corporation does not become "ownerless" in this scenario but is
instead self-owning, self-determinate, and liberated from direct individual human
26
shareholder control. 1
My sense is that Iwai is onto something. But I think the idea has greater utility
than explaining differences in corporate behavior on a comparative basis.
Its forward-looking possibilities are worth exploring. The self-owning corporation frees
itself from any necessity of a correspondence between the needs of the entity (to survive
and grow) and the needs of its owners (to increase their wealth). A self-owning entity
with an objective of maximizing the value of the entity can make decisions based on the
valuation of a selected mix of factors that can be very different from what the entity
might have used, had its ultimate objective been limited to maximizing the short term
value of the shareholder's interests in the entity (or of the aggregate). This idea is not
revolutionary by any stretch. The Delaware courts have embraced a variant of this
127
insight by respecting the power of boards of directors to resist purchase offers.
However, the possibility of self-ownership suggests more than the contours of
relationships between owners and entity. It suggests that the self-owning corporation can

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Iwai, supran. 11, at 598-99.
122. Id. at 599.
123. Id.
124. Id. Iwai argues that "[t]hese twelve corporations would indeed become their own owners at least as a
group. And if fifty-two corporations can get together, they only have to hold 1 percent of each other's shares to
secure the majority block for each. It is therefore practically impossible to prevent corporations from becoming
their own owners, if they so wish." Id.
125. Iwai, supran. 11,at613.
126. Id. at 600.
127. See e.g. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Cheff v. Mathes, 199
A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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effectively avoid regulation by its shareholders. If shareholders do not control the entity
directly-if the entity controls itself-then it is the entity's managers who become the
instruments of this control. The parameters of this control are then subject to managerial
self-restraint. That self-restraint is cultural.128 There has been much recent scholarship
on the importance of enterprise culture to the operation of enterprises "on the
ground." 129 But restraint is also political. Autonomous from its shareholders, the
self-governing enterprise is still subject to the political will of the state under the rules of
which it has been organized. Even a realistic capitalism "presupposes the capacity of the
state or 'system' to exercise power with authority in conscious, willed aims
13 0
and directions."
Iwai's realistic enterprise suggests the possibility of an entity autonomous from its
shareholders, just like Hansmann and Kraakman's enterprise suggested the possibility of
entity autonomy with respect to enterprise creditors. But, like the possibility of
enterprise autonomy from creditor-stakeholders suggested by Hansmann and Kraakman,
the possibility of enterprise autonomy from shareholder-stakeholders suggested by Iwai
is limited by a territorial principle. The suggested self-ownership and autonomy from
shareholders are grounded on the necessity for a correspondence between regulatory
authority, an economic-cultural source, and the self-owning enterprise.
Our new indeterminacy thesis has opened up a new way of linking the formal system of
law with the actual world of society. Law is... able to provide a "menu" of corporate
structures from which a society can choose. Indeed, each society can choose any position
along a long spectrum that runs from a purely "nominalistic" to a purely "realistic"
structure, on the basis of or at least under the influence of economic efficiency,
political interests, ideological
forces, cultural traditions, historical evolution and other
13 1
extra-legal factors.

Entity autonomy, then, is limited by the culture that permits its existence within the
territory of the legal regime that provides the framework within which it can operate.
Thus, Iwai suggests that the "dominant corporate form varies widely from country to
country.", 132 In a world in which there is correspondence between the regulator and its
object of regulation, this model works well. But what happens when the critical factorcorrespondence-is eliminated? It is to a world in which that variable is no longer
controlled, but in which both entity autonomy from shareholders and entity autonomy for
creditors is preserved, that we turn to next.

128. lwai, supra n. 11, at 607 ("Notwithstanding large variations within each type of capitalism, we still find
it a useful working hypothesis to assume that American managers are generally expected to maximize the
returns to shareholders and that Japanese managers are generally expected to emphasize the survival and
growth of the corporation as an organizational entity."); see Tadao Kagono et al., Strategic vs. Evolutionary
Management: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of Strategy and Organization(Nichi-Bei kigyo no keiei hikaku trans.,
Elsevier Sci. Publg. Co. 1985).
129. E.g. Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The PoliticalRoots ofAmerican CorporateFinance
(Princeton U. Press 1994); see also Michael E. Porter, Hirotaka Takeuchi & Mariko Sakakibara, Can Japan
Compete? (Basic Bks. 2000).
130. John Owen Haley, Authority without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox 139 (Oxford U.
Press 1991).
131. Iwai, supra n. 11, at 604.
132. Id. (Iwai proceeds to explore two capitalisms: the realism of Japan and the nominalism of the United
States.).
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IV.

GLOBALIZATION AND PERVERSITY: THE TERRITORIAL AND

REGULATORY HIERARCHY PRINCIPLES IN A TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT

The correspondence between enterprise regulation and the borders of state power
has proven to be both troublesome and persistent. The territorial principle is easy
enough to state:
For several hundred years, the European and later the world order, has been characterised
by the central role of the sovereign nation state. The world is divided into territorial units
housing permanent populations each of which is subject to the exclusive and
comprehensive rule of an apparatus consisting of various agencies-including those
responsible for legislation, adjudication and administration-which is called a
sovereign state. 133
The territorial principle underlies the little questioned notion that it is the state that
permits the creation of any entity, endows it with qualities, and permits it to assert legal
rights in its courts. "The internal legal order of [a multinational enterprise] is, therefore,
is
endorsed by each relevant state and becomes part of the domestic law of each state, or134
it."
to
consent
states
those
because
order
legal
state's
integrated into the
The territorial principle, based on notions of sovereignty, also implies the idea of
regulatory hierarchy-state regulation is the supreme form of the constitution of entities
and of the rules governing the relationship between entity and those with an interest in it.
To the extent that such interests are represented by private contractual arrangements, the
state is involved as well-for it is the state that countenances these arrangements and
permits their enforcements through its administrative and judicial apparatus.
"The 'traditional rule' attributes rights (and by implication, liabilities) with respect to a
which the TNC is
[transnational corporation ("TNC")] to the state under the laws of135
office."
registered
its
has
it
which
of
territory
the
in
and
incorporated
But territories have limits. And the territorial principle-for all of the supremacy it
lends to state and political power or the power of law-also has well-defined limits.
Those limits correspond to the borders of the state itself. The territorial principle thus
has a corollary principle of non-interference-the power to exclude external actors
(principally other states) from exercising domestic authority. 136 Only one state exists for
every territory. 137 "The grundnorm of such a political arrangement (sovereign
statehood) is the basic prohibition against foreign intervention which simultaneously
138
imposes a duty of forbearance and confers a right of independence."'
This non-interference corollary significantly impedes extra-territorial application of

133. Jtlrgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono, Legal Aspects of Globalization:Conflict of Laws, Internet, Capital
Markets and Insolvency in a Global Economy 4 (Aspen Pubs. 2000).
134. Tania Voon, MultinationalEnterprises and State Sovereignty under InternationalLaw, 21 Adelaide L.
Rev. 219, 238 (1999) (footnote omitted).
135. Fleur Johns, The Invisibility of the TransnationalCorporation:An Analysis of InternationalLaw and
Legal Theory, 19 Melbourne Univ. L. Rev. 893, 895 (1994) (citing Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co.,
Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 70) (footnote omitted).
136. See U.S. v. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, T 202.
137. Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 20 (Princeton U. Press 1999).
138. Id.(quoting Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, InternationalRelations, and the Third
World 6 (Cambridge U. Press 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
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national law, though it does not prevent such application entirely, especially by
politically powerful states.
The classical model of enterprise tended to posit a correspondence between
enterprise and its regulatory regime. In that context, both the territorial principle and the
principle of regulatory hierarchy work well. Every entity is subject to the sole regulation
of a single state. Each entity is itself subject to the same sort of regulation, and that
regulation is superior to any sort of arrangements that the entity stakeholders can make.
A consciousness that this reality had changed began to emerge in the last century:
[I]f one looks to the modem world economy, one concludes that enterprises have
increasingly chosen to organize and conduct their business operations in the form of a
cluster of various separate corporations, rather than as a single corporate entity. Instead of
the initial atomistic corporate world living under a perfect competition and free market
model, the present century assisted the rise of an economic order largely dominated by
multinational and multicorporate groups. Therefore, the major enterprise has typically
evolved as a complex, large-scale business network, where the different parts of a unitary
business are allocated to a group of affiliated corporations (subsidiary corporations), global
co-ordination is obtained through the submission of such legally independent parts to a
common economic strategy,
and management of the whole is exercised by headquarters
13 9
(parent corporation).
If one adds to the mix the possibility of non-corporate economic enterprises and
networks of economic affiliations in non-corporate forms, 140 one can begin to imagine a
world in which economic and political activity do not march in lock step over the same
terrain. 14 1 In such a world the factors that make the territorial and regulatory hierarchy
principles so valuable in the governance of entities within a particular territory produce a
perverse effect.
The context in which the consequences of a global network of national systems in
which entity autonomy had been solidified, and entity self-ownership was possible, was
the emergence of globalization after World War II. Globalization comprised a system of
free movement of capital, and to a lesser extent, labor and technology. Consciousness of
the perversities of the system emerged with an understanding of the manner in which the
state-based system of entity regulation limited the regulation of these entities.
The greater the possibility of dispersal of operations among different regulatory regimes,
the greater the advantage to the entity at the expense of the regulating territorial unit.
"Indeed, the ability of a [multinational enterprise] to take advantage of differences in
regulatory environments between states is seen as one of its internalization
42
advantages."1
The nature of the perversities is well-known. 143 They range from the benign to the
disturbing. Enterprises can exploit the territorial principle, the principles of limited

139. Jos6 Engr~cia Atunes, The Liability of PolycorporateEnterprises, 13 Conn. J. Intl. L. 197, 203 (1999)
(footnote omitted).
140. Muchlinski, supra n. 18, at 57-89.
141. Jean-Philippe Robd, MultinationalEnterprises:The Constitution of a PluralisticLegal Order, in Global
Law without a State 45, 46 (Gunther Teubner ed., Dartmouth Publg. 1997).
142. Muchlinski, supra n. 18, at 45.
143. For a description, see Johns, supra n. 135, at 904-11.
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liability, and that of independent juridical personality to minimize risk to assets
partitioned to the entity. This risk minimization is accomplished by distributing assets
among widely dispersed subsidiaries incorporated in different jurisdictions and by
engaging in enterprise activities indirectly through joint ventures, distributorships,
franchises, local agents, or other indirect forms of operation. Multinational enterprises
have been able to exploit their economic power to negotiate with states for the enactment
of regulations favorable to the enterprise and to avoid liability for local actions, local
taxes, and other impositions charged by the state to others similarly situated.
Multinational enterprises have also used their power to intervene directly or indirectly in
the politics of political jurisdictions. The involvement of large enterprises in local civil
wars, coups, and other changes of government, and the willingness of enterprises to
engage in local corruption are well documented. Traditional methods for limiting the
ability of multinational enterprises to avoid local consequences-piercing the corporate
veil, imposition of enterprise liability, extraterritorial application of local law, invoking
the legal process of the courts of the territory of the parent company of an integrated
enterprise-have had little success in extending the power of states relative to these
enterprises in a world in which enterprises may move capital and operations with some
ease (at least to some places) and then protect those assets by invocating the territorial
principle and the non-interference principle.144
The limitations of the territorial principle and its perverse consequences for the
regulation of enterprises, the operation of which was widely dispersed across regulating
states, became well-known by the end of the twentieth century. Even the United States,
a state with an extraordinarily long regulatory arm, discovered the limitations of its
regulatory reach at the conclusion of World War II, with respect to enterprises
traditionally considered "American."
The activities of General Motors, Ford and Chrysler prior to and during World
War II

. ..

are instructive.

At that time, these three firms dominated motor vehicle

production in both the United States and Germany. Due to its mass production capabilities,
automobile manufacturing is one of the most crucial industries with respect to national
defense. As a result, these firms retained the economic and political power to affect the
shape of governmental relations both within and between these nations in a manner which
maximized corporate global profits.
In short, they were private governments
unaccountable to the citizens of any country yet possessing tremendous influence over the
course of war and peace in the world.
During the 1920's and 1930's, the Big Three automakers undertook an extensive
program of multinational expansion.... By the mid-1930's, these three American
companies owned automotive subsidiaries throughout Europe and the Far East; many of
their largest facilities were located in the politically sensitive nations of Germany, Poland,
Rumania, Austria, Hungary, Latvia, and Japan.... Due to their concentrated economic
power over motor vehicle production in both Allied and Axis territories, the Big Three
inevitably became major factors in the preparations and progress of the war.

144. See Sarah Joseph, Corporationsand TransnationalHuman Rights Litigation (Hart Publg. 2004).
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The outbreak of war in September 1939 resulted inevitably in the full conversion by
GM and Ford of their Axis plants to the production of military aircraft and trucks.

On the ground, GM and Ford subsidiaries built nearly 90 percent of the armored
"mule" 3-ton half-trucks and more than 70 percent of the Reich's medium and heavy-duty
trucks.
These vehicles, according to American intelligence reports, served as
"the backbone of the German Army transportation system."

After the cessation of hostilities, GM and Ford demanded reparations from the U.S.
Government for wartime damages sustained by their Axis facilities as a result of Allied
bombing.... Ford received a little less than $1 million,
primarily as a result of damages
14 5
sustained by its military truck complex at Cologne.
By the 1970s, multinational enterprises "began to be described as a challenge to the
nation state, a creature with no loyalties except to itself, an entity that caused economic,
social and political disruption in both the host and home countries, and aimed at global
146
dominance. The [multinational enterprise] had to be tamed."
But taming the multinational enterprise was easier said than done in the context of
an international system unwilling to yield the primacy of the territorial principle.
The regulatory limitations of the territorial principle are evidenced by examining the way
the principle constrains state attempts to regulate multinational enterprises that are not
subject to regulation in their entirety by any single jurisdiction. The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises14 7 represent the efforts by a cluster of developed states to coordinate their
regulation of economic enterprises by suggesting a code of conduct for multinational
enterprises. 148 Consider, in a different light, the way in which the OECD works.
Its foundations are grounded in the limitations and state-centered prerogatives of the
territorial principle. In essence, the OECD is a loose organization of states pledged to
cooperate with each other. 149 Each, however, guards its power to regulate within

145. Sen. Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the Comm. on the Jud., American Ground Transport:
A Proposalfor Restructuringthe Automobile, Truck, Bus, and Rail Industries, 93d Cong. 16-17, 22 (Feb. 26,
1974) (footnotes omitted) (authored by Bradford C. Snell). The proposal rejected the idea that there was
equivalence between the war conduct of the automakers in World War II and the common American corporate
practice of donating to the two large political parties. "Had the Nazis won, General Motors and Ford would
have appeared impeccably Nazi; as Hitler lost, these companies were able to reemerge impeccably American.
In either case, the viability of these corporations and the interests of their respective stockholders would have
been preserved." Id. at 22-23.
146. Muchlinski, supra n. 18, at 7.
147. OECD, Guidelines, supra n. 18. For a discussion of the OECD Guidelines, see Muchlinski, supra
n. 18, at 578-92.
148. OECD notes: "The Guidelines are recommendations jointly addressed by governments to multi-national
enterprises. They provide principles and standards of good practice consistent with applicable laws." OECD,
Guidelines, supra n. 18, at 17.
149. The Chair of the Ministerial stated,
The Guidelines are recommendations on responsible business conduct addressed by governments
to multinational enterprises operating in or from the 33 adhering countries. While many businesses
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its territory. Legislative power is not devolved to this organization. Thus, it is also
limited by the hierarchy principle of regulation. The limits of the provision of
governance mechanisms beyond the state, then, in the words of the OECD
website, are
150
reduced to reliance on "dialogue, consensus, peer review and pressure."'
By both preserving control over the state's respective limited territorial
jurisdictions and seeking to coordinate regulation within a group of like-minded
jurisdictions, the OECD evidences the limits of its authority to regulate those
organizations outside of its jurisdiction.151 It must treat all such objects of regulations as
regulatory equals in effect. 152 OECD guidance is thus voluntary, not necessarily
because voluntary compliance is a good in itself, but because compulsion, the usual
methodology of the state, is not available. The effectiveness of compliance is based on a
willingness to provide guidelines that the "guided" are willing to bear. Consultation and
cooperation with the guided, therefore, forms a basis of the regulatory activity of the
OECD. 153 Peer pressure and review is also constrained by both the territorial principle
and the regulatory hierarchy principle and limited to the state party members of the
OECD in the context of maintaining their mutual obligations under the OECD
15 4
Convention.
Resistance to any substantial efforts by international institutions to create a legal
framework for the regulation of multinational enterprises has been effective. These
efforts, led by nation-states, have been fueled by fear that internationalization will erode
the primacy of states as regulators. The latest failure involved the abandonment of a

have developed their own codes of conduct in recent years, the OECD Guidelines are the only
multilaterally endorsed and comprehensive code that governments are committed to promoting.
Id. at 5.
150. OECD, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649 201185 1 1_1_1_1,00.html
(accessed July 21, 2006).
151. Together, the U.N. Global Compact Office and the OECD Secretariat stated:
Although the OECD welcomes expressions of support for the Guidelines, its implementation
process does not depend on them-the normative framework upon which the Guidelines is based is
deemed to be so fundamental that its relevance to companies is taken for granted. Responsibility for
promoting the recommendations in the Guidelines lies primarily with the adhering governments as
does the administration of the Guidelines' unique follow up mechanism.
U.N. Global Compact & OECD, The UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises: Complementarities and Distinctive Contributions 6 (Apr. 26, 2005) (available at http://
www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/0,2546,en_2649374613487373211 -137461,00.html (accessed July 21,
2006)).
152. Thus, for example, the mechanisms provided for implementing the Guidelines suggest that the state
parties are effectively no more than facilitators of the Guidelines. Both the system of National Contact Points
and the oversight of the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises suggest a focus
on persuasion, publicity, and communication, rather than compulsion. See OECD, Guidelines, supra n. 18,
at 35-37.
153. The OECD website notes that
[s]ince its creation, the OECD has co-operated with civil society, principally through the Business
and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee
(TUAC).
The OECD also has long-standing relations with parliamentarians through the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.
OECD, Civil Society and Parliamentarians, http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34495
1 1_1_1 l,00.html (accessed July, 21, 2006).
154. See Fabrizio Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-Operation and Change: An Analysis of an OECD
Working Method,http://www.oecd.org/dataoeed/33/16/1955285.pdf (accessed July 21, 2006).
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United Nations project to create a binding body of Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights ("Norms").155 The history of the failure of the Norms evidences both the perverse
power of the territorial principle and the limitations of international political institutions
to overcome that perversity and reassert a politically centered regulatory framework.
The Norms reflected the belief of many developing states, academics, and
non-governmental human rights organizations, as embraced within the human rights
institutions of the United Nations:
[T]he global power of TNCs dwarf that of many developing nations. TNCs' economic
power produces social and political power as well, power that is enormous and global.
TNCs can affect the level of enjoyment of the economic, social, and political rights of
people across states, but states cannot effectively regulate them. Some regulation at the
international level is necessary to control the possibility of abuse by TNCs of their
dominant position and to ensure that TNCs contribute to the development of less156
developed
states and to the protection of individuals' social, political, and economic rights.
Originally it was presented as a legally binding instrument of international governance
imposing direct obligations on TNCs. It became clearer that 'the Norms would
effectively be abandoned in their current form by the spring of 2005. It appeared that the
High Commissioner would recommend that the Commission "maintain the draft Norms
among existing initiatives and standards on business and human rights, with a view to
their further consideration.'"1 57 This result followed intense pressure from developed

155. See U.N. Commn. on Hum. Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/0/
64155e7e8141b38cc1256d63002c55e8?OpenDocument (accessed July 21, 2006). All references to the Norms
are to the revised Norms. For the official commentary on the Norms, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Commn.
on Hum. Rights Sub-Commn. on the Promotion & Protec. of Hum. Rights, Commentary on the Norms on the
Responsibilities of TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.38.Rev.2.En?Opendocument
(accessed July 21, 2006). For a report on the finalization of the statement of Norms, see U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council, Comni. on Hum. Rights Sub-Commn. on the Promotion & Protec. of Hum. Rights, Report of the
Sessional Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of TransnationalCorporationson its Fifth
Session,
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/906e3013fl cb27eac 1256d82004d7fe2?
Opendocument (accessed July 21, 2006). For a discussion of the Norms, see Backer, supra n. 19.
156. Backer, supra n. 19, at 319.
157. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Commn. on Hum. Rights, Sub-Commn. on the Promotion & Protec. of
Hum. Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/docs/61chr/E.CN.4.2005.91 .doc (accessed July 23, 2006). The Report
of the High Commissioner also suggested:
Much of the consultation process focused on the draft "Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights." In spite
of opinions on the draft still being divided, there is merit in identifying more closely the "useful
elements" of the draft Norms noted by the Commission in its decision 2004/116. In particular, the
"road-testing" of the draft Norms by the Business Leaders' Initiative on Human Rights could
provide greater insight into the practical nature of the human rights responsibilities of business.
Id.
at 18. Indeed, by the end of 2005, the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, in conjunction with the
U.N. Global Compact and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, had produced a
consultation draft that in many respects mirrored the focus of the Norms. Bus. Leaders Initiative on Hum.
Rights,
A
Guide for Integrating Human Rights
into Business Management, http://
www.blihr.org/Pdfs/GIHRBM.pdf (accessed July 23, 2006). Unlike the Norms, however, this effort was
business-focused and voluntary, offering "practical guidance to companies that want to take a proactive
approach to human rights within their business operations." Id. at 3.
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states, especially the United States, to avoid the construction of any international system
58
of regulation of economic enterprises.1
Thus, the territorial principle creates a framework within which power to regulate
the enterprise is dispersed-from the state to a collection of collectives (states and
enterprises and cooperative bodies) and among states. It does this by producing and
sustaining regimes of voluntary multi-state systems of behavior control. In this
environment, an enterprise with the ability to disperse assets and operations can
substantially choose the aggregate of its regulatory environment-it can effectively
regulate itself.
Self-regulation follows from the application of the territorial principle, coupled
with the possibilities of enterprise autonomy reinforced by asset partitioning regimes,
self-ownership, and juridical personhood. An autonomous legal subject, responsible for
its own obligations and able to direct itself can, by distributing its operations in
accordance with the benefits of particular territorially limited legal regimes, effectively
choose the mix of regulation to which it will submit itself. It follows that such an
enterprise can regulate itself. A fully self-conscious autonomy is now complete.
V.

CAN AN ENTERPRISE REGULATE ITSELF? CREATING THE SELF-REGULATING ENTITY

I have discussed how the territorial principle and the principle of regulatory
hierarchy can open the possibility of enterprise self-regulation. Any enterprise that can
disperse its assets among a large enough number of regulatory units will transform the
relationship between regulator and enterprise. For the traditional relationship that is both
singular and hierarchical, globalization permits the enterprise to treat regulation as
another factor in the production of wealth. The enterprise, now in a position to shop for
regulatory regimes, or even bargain for domestication within the territory of a regulatory
territory, can take advantage of the limitations of the territorial principle to minimize the
effects of regulation on enterprise activity. The principle of regulatory hierarchy can
then be turned on its head. The ability to "commodify" regulation makes it at least
theoretically possible to construct an economic entity which, through careful planning,
can take advantage of asset partitioning, cross holdings, and global asset dispersion to
avoid effective regulation by any one political community.
I have been sketching out a picture of regulatory autonomy at a fairly high level of
abstraction. It may be useful to try to illustrate the concept in more concrete terms.
I will suggest one example, though there are countless variations possible. It is
important to note, however, that this is an area that would profit by much empirical
research. For the moment, my purpose is to suggest a hypothesis and to provide the
framework for analysis.
The self-regulating corporation I suggest here turns the usual analysis upside
down.
That usual analysis posits the distinctive regulatory problem posed by

158. Memo. from U.S. Mission to Intl. Orgs. to Dzidek Kedzia, Chief of Research & Right to Dev. Branch,
Off. of the U.N. High Commr. for Hum. Rights, Note Verbale from the OHCHR of Aug. 3, 2004 (GVA 2537)
(Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/business/docs/us.pdf (accessed July 23,
2006) ("By attempting to establish duties and obligations for business entities, which are non-State actors, this
exercise goes well beyond the present state of international law as well as international legal process.").
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multinational corporations is their ability to operate an integrated command and control
system through two disaggregated institutional structures. The first of these structures is
the collection of discrete corporate units-parent, subsidiary, sister, and cousin
companies-that make up the Multi-National Corporation group.
The second
disaggregated structure housing the Multi-National Corporation is the global system of
15 9
separate nation-states in which those corporations are registered and do business.
In the usual case, this regulatory autonomy centers on the ability of a firm to avoid
distasteful regulations relating to its operations. Consider, for example, Clothing, a
company that makes its money by designing and selling to retail establishments several
lines of children's clothing. Clothing is incorporated in Delaware, and its shares are
traded on financial markets in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Clothing's
headquarters are in Savannah, Georgia, where Clothing conducts all of its operations.
Assume that United States regulations have now substantially increased the costs of
making clothing in the United States. Assume further that these regulations may have
extraterritorial effect because the regulations apply to all corporations incorporated in
any United States jurisdiction, no matter where its operations are located.
Clothing has a variety of options to avoid this regulatory framework, for example,
transferring its operations to directly owned subsidiaries abroad, contracting out the
manufacture of clothing to partially owned or independent entities resident in other
states, and entering into joint ventures for the direct manufacture or indirect manufacture
of clothing elsewhere. The list is hardly exhaustive. Clothing-either directly or
through its potential subsidiaries, joint venture partners, or (in)dependent contractorscan also engage in negotiations with appropriately selected host states for the appropriate
form of regulatory environment. If the operations are sufficiently large or the needs of
the host state are particularly easy to satisfy, there is some chance that local law might be
modified to the benefit of Clothing's operations. To the extent that operations will be
directly controlled, provision can be made for limiting the home corporation's exposure
to liability under local law. 160 The cost savings from these efforts, if greater than the
increased costs of the regulations in the home state, make these complexities worth the
trouble.
Where a corporation can distribute its operations in a sufficiently complete way, it
has turned the tables on the state. Clothing has essentially chosen, in the aggregate, the
bundle of regulations to which its operations will be subject. By carefully choosing the
place, form, and method of operation, it can effectively decide the manner in which it
will be regulated. States may legislate to their hearts' content, but the enterprise will
submit to those regulations only to the extent it is either unavoidable or profitable.

159. Eric Engle, ExtraterritorialCorporate Criminal Liability: A Remedy for Human Rights Violations?
20 St. John's J. Leg. Comment 287, 300 (2006).
160. This has become a complicated business as some jurisdictions have sought to apply a "corporate
groups" or entity theory of liability, essentially holding a complex of related entities jointly liable for the
wrongdoings of any of them under certain circumstances. These complications are suggested here but lie well
outside the scope of this article. See e.g. Robert P. Austin, CorporateGroups, in CorporatePersonalityin the
20th Century 71-89 (Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett eds., Hart Publg. 1998) (noting particularly efforts
in Australia). For a an example of a germinal American perspective, see Philip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability
and CorporateGroups, 1 J. Corp. L. 573 (1986).
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The tables have been turned on the state in another important way. From the
perspective of the self-regulating corporation, the role of states has changed. No longer
holders of a monopoly power to regulate the enterprise, states are now mere producers of
a good-regulation-that can be characterized as a cost of operations. Like other
operating costs, the costs of law can be modified or reduced through avoidance. Where
the entity cannot avoid regulation, it is limited as regulation increases the price of goods.
But where there is no monopoly on regulation, then avoidance, and the substitution of
one legal regime for another becomes possible. In effect, entity and state have changed
positions.
Self-regulation becomes more interesting when the sort of regulation that is sought
focuses not on operations, but on governance. Governance regimes in the context of
mobile corporations are no longer unavoidable assumptions constraining corporate
actions. Instead, they are better understood as goods. "Once different national
governance systems were understood as more than just way stations on the road to
convergence, comparative scholars began to treat institutional differences as having
competitive consequences. Competition was not just between products, but also between
governance systems." 16 1 Whether this leads to a global "Delaware effect" is still the
subject of debate, as much about the existence of this effect is about its consequences for
corporate decision making. 162 But the field of competition for consumption of
regulation has now expanded beyond states and public law. While searching for an
answer to the convergence issue in corporate law, commentators note the rise of
alternative systems of regulation, either hybrid systems or regulatory systems based on
private law that cut across borders.1 63 From the perspective of a self-regulating
corporation, this opens an even greater set of possibilities for fashioning an internal
regulatory framework that suits it rather than any single political community seeking to
assert exclusive regulatory authority.
Thus, that a multinational economic enterprise can be autonomous with respect to
the state does not necessarily mean that the enterprise will always look to itself for the
establishment of an enterprise-specific regulatory framework. As Gunther Teubner has
suggested recently:
Grotius' famous proposition ubi societas ibi ius has to be reformulated in the conditions of
the functional differentiation of the planet in such a way that, wherever autonomous social
sectors develop, autonomous law is simultaneously produced, at a relative distance from
politics. Law-making also takes place outside the classical sources of international law, in
agreements between global players, in private market regulation by multi-national
concerns, internal regulations of international organisations, inter-organisational

161. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing CorporateGovernance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 Am. J.

Comp. L. 329, 330 (2001). Professor Gilson considered the power of corporate convergence and suggested
that "[b]ecause the flexibility of governance and political institutions will differ not only between countries, but

within individual countries based on the particular response called for by changed conditions, the most we can

predict is substantial variation both across and within different national systems." Id. at 337.
162. For a discussion of the complications of predicting the vector of change in corporate governance
regulation when jurisdictions compete for corporate business by selling their corporate governance statutes in
the United States, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588 (2003).
163. See e.g. John C. Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641 (1999).
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negotiating systems, world-wide standardisation processes that •come
about partly in
organisations.,164

markets and partly in the processes of negotiation among

Multinational economic enterprise autonomy from the state has permitted the
development of a set of regulatory frameworks for these enterprises outside the state.
But such a regulatory system need not be independent of the mechanisms of state power.
As the construction of the OECD regulatory system suggests, the autonomous enterprise
can even develop its own institutional framework for self-regulation among the
community of economic enterprises similarly situated in concert with states, now not so
much as regulators, but instead as partners in the attainment of mutually beneficial goals.
A recent example of this practice can be seen in the area of security and human rights.
The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands
plus companies operating in the extractive and energy sectors and non-governmental
organizations, all with an interest in human rights and corporate social responsibility, have
engaged in the dialogue
on security and human rights and have collectively developed the
165
Voluntary Principles.

The mechanics of these Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights ("Voluntary
Principles") are coordinated by a secretariat jointly held by the International Business
Leaders Forum and Business for Social Responsibility. 166 The Voluntary Principles
suggest a set of guidelines for negotiating the contours of enterprise activity in the
security sector. 167
The more common form of autonomous self-regulation is the voluntary code
framework that has proliferated in the international sphere since the last third of the
twentieth century. Two examples of this form of self-regulation suggest the nature of
this form of regulation. The first is the United Nation's Global Compact, 168 a corporate
citizen initiative centered on a self-regulating group of enterprises guided by the United
Nations-the preeminent global political institution. The second is the related Guidefor
Integrating Human Rights into Business Management ("Guide") developed by the
69
Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights. 1
The Global Compact is a diluted version of the recently abandoned effort to
implement the Norms as a more binding international law for the regulation of
transnational corporations. In its own words:

164. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism:Alternatives to State-CenteredConstitutional Theory? in
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism 16 (Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther
Teubner eds., Hart Publg. 2004) (citing, among others, Robd, supra n. 141) (footnote omitted).
165. Intl. Bus. Leaders Forum & Bus. for Soc. Resp., Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/participants/index.php (accessed July 23, 2006).
166. Intl. Bus. Leaders Forum & Bus. for Soc. Resp., Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/contact/index.php (accessed July 23, 2006).
167. Intl. Bus. Leaders Forum & Bus. for Soc. Resp., Voluntary Principles on Security & Human Rights,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/principles/index.php (accessed July 23, 2006).
168. U.N. Global Compact,
Welcome to the United Nations Global Compact, http://
www.unglobalcompact.org (accessed July 23, 2006).
169. Bus. Leaders Initiative on Hum. Rights, A Guide for Integrating Human Rights into Business
Management, http://www.blihr.org/Pdfs/GIHRBM.pdf (accessed July 23, 2006); see supra n. 157 and
accompanying text.
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Through the power of collective action, the Global Compact seeks to promote responsible
corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the challenges of
globalisation. In this way, the private sector-in partnership with other social actors--can
help realize the Secretary-General's vision: a more sustainable and inclusive
global economy.
The Global Compact is a purely voluntary initiative with two objectives:
*
*

Mainstream the ten principles in business activities around the world
Catalyse actions in support of UN goals

To achieve these objectives, the Global Compact offers facilitation and engagement
through several mechanisms: Policy Dialogues, Learning, Country/Regional Networks,
and Projects.
The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument-it does not "police," enforce or
measure the behavior or actions of companies. Rather, the Global Compact relies on public
accountability, transparency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labour and civil
society to initiate and share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which the
170
Global Compact is based.
It should come as little surprise that the ten principles look suspiciously like the core
provisions of the recently abandoned Norms. International institutions-unable to
compel at the international level and unsuccessful in binding states to implement
framework legislation that harmonizes and coordinates regulations-must cooperate with
the objects of their regulation, transforming and cajoling the Norms into a voluntary
conduct code. 17 1 For example,
[c]ompanies initiate their participation in the Global Compact through a leadership
commitment by their CEO and (where appropriate) Board that is communicated to the
United Nations. Business and other societal actors also engage directly in the various
engagement mechanisms that the Global Compact offers at the global, regional and local
level, such as practical solution finding, identification of good practices and projects on the
17 2
ground.
The Guide follows a similar approach. Like the United Nation's Global Compact
initiative, the Guide seeks to provide a vehicle for the normalization of the practices
developed in the now abandoned Norms through a program of voluntary practice.
"Many of the companies that have contributed to this Guide, especially the companies
involved in the [Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights], agree that the content of
the Draft Norms provides a helpful framework for human rights in business." 173 The
specific contribution of the Guide is to provide a "technical manual and a hands-on
toolkit to help any company integrate practices consistent with human rights standards

170. U.N. Global Compact, What is the Global Compact? http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/
index.html (accessed July 23, 2006).
171. The ten principles are divided into four groups: human rights, labor standards, environment, and
anti-corruption. See U. N. Global Compact, The Ten Principles, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/About
TheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (accessed July 23, 2006). To compare similar provisions in the now
abandoned Norms, see Backer, supra n. 19, at 137-62.
172. U.N. Global Compact & OECD, supra n. 151, at 6.
173. Bus. Leaders Initiative on Hum. Rights, supra n. 157, at 4.
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into an existing management system."' 174 The Guide is interesting as a form of voluntary
regulation developed from collaborative efforts between communities of multinational
enterprises and international institutional actors operating as partners, rather than as
source and subject of regulation. The horizontal nature of their relationship, necessary
for the production of this code and the code's voluntary nature, suggest the extent of
enterprise autonomy and the way in which new institutions are being developed for the
regulation of increasingly autonomous entities.
The business of generating rules that serve as a substitute for traditional law
making among the community of multinational enterprises and those actors,
governmental and private, national and international-with a stake in their governancehas only continued to grow since the end of the last century. In addition to state-centered
voluntary initiatives like the OECD Guidelines, a number of other actors have also
sought to promote forms of voluntary trans-border regulation of behavior for economic
enterprises. Some have been produced by other sectors of the international institutional
community. For example, the International Labour Organization has produced the
ILO Declarationon FundamentalPrinciples and Rights at Work, aimed at regulating the
17 5
relationship between enterprises and their labor forces on a global basis.
Other non-state global players-for example, international human rights organizations
like Amnesty International-have developed voluntary codes. 176 Another is the Sullivan
Foundation's 177 Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility ("Global Sullivan
179
Principles"),178 endorsed by a large number of major economic enterprises.
The thrust of the Global Sullivan Principles is similar to that of the Norms-centering on
the promotion of human rights, anti-subordination principles in the workplace, labor
organization rights, and sensitivity to development issues in local communities based on
180
a respect for the law.

174. Id. at5.
175. Intl. Labour Org., ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.INDEXPAGE (accessed July 23, 2006).
176. See Amnesty Intl. Hum. Rights Principles for Cos., http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
engACT700011998?open&of--eng-398 (accessed July 23, 2006).
177. Leon H. Sullivan Found., Mission Statement, http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/foundation/
index.asp (accessed July 23, 2006). The Mission Statement provides:
Our mission is to carry on the spirit and legacy of Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, the great African
American international humanitarian, by leveraging the commitments and resources of the African
Diaspora and Friends of Africa for positive change in the world. We do so by advocating for
domestic and international issues that Rev. Sullivan dedicated his life to, by supporting the work of
the organizations he founded, and by providing a platform for Africa's political, economic and
cultural leaders in the United States. Our work is guided by the principles that Rev. Sullivan
championed: self-help, social responsibility, economic empowerment and human rights.
Id.
178. Leon H. Sullivan Found., The Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility,
http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/principles/gsp/default.asp (accessed July 23, 2006).
179. For a list of endorsing
companies, see Leon H. Sullivan
Found., Endorsers,
http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/endorsers/charter/default.asp (accessed July 23, 2006).
180. Leon H. Sullivan Found., supra n. 177. The website explains "[tlhe aspiration of the Principles is to
have companies and organizations of all sizes, in widely disparate industries and cultures, working toward the
common goals of human rights, social justice and economic opportunity." Leon H. Sullivan Found., Global
Sullivan Principles, http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/default.asp (accessed July 23, 2006).
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Many of these codes evidence the power of self-regulation within the community
of multinational enterprises. Some originate within organizations serving economic
enterprises themselves.
These represent the glimmerings of the constitution of
multinational enterprises as an autonomous community of entities that have begun to
regulate themselves through the construction of systems of governance independent of
the states. For example, institutional market organizations have developed voluntary
codes aimed at multinational enterprises and others that access capital through their
organizations. 1 8 1 Similarly, companies offering indexing services for enterprises
seeking to participate in the capital markets have also produced voluntary codes and
reporting systems designed to enhance business access to capital by compliance with its
codes. 182 For example,
[t]he FTSE4Good Index Series has been designed to measure the performance of
companies that meet globally recognised corporate responsibility standards, and to
facilitate investment in those companies. Transparent management and criteria alongside
the FTSE brand make FTSE4Good
the index of choice for the creation of Socially
183
Responsible Investment products.
In addition to collaborative projects between economic enterprises and
international institutions that result in regulation like the Guide, other aggregations of
like-minded multinational economic enterprises have formed groups for the purpose of
creating systems of self-regulation. An example is Social Accountability International,
an American-based non-governmental organization 184 with representatives from a
variety of economic entities that have developed a voluntary workplace standard for
enterprises, the SA8000. Like the Guide, the SA8000 is "based on international
workplace norms in the International Labour Organisation conventions and the Universal
' 185
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child."
Compliance-seeking companies can either have their facilities certified as SA8000
compliant or become part of a "Corporate Involvement Program." 186 Institutionally, the
organization acts as facilitator and conduit of information. 187 Another is the Caux

181. See Dow Jones Sustainability Index, http://www.sustainability-index.com (accessed July 23, 2006).
182. See e.g. FTSE, FTSE: The Index Company, http://www.ftse.com (accessed July 23, 2006). "FTSE is an
independent company owned by The Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange. Our sole business is
the creation and management of indices and associated data services, on an international scale." FTSE, FTSE:
The Index Company, http://www.ftse.com/AboutUs/index.jsp (accessed July 23, 2006).
183. FSTE4Good Index Series, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4GoodIndexSeries/index.jsp (accessed
July 23, 2006).
184. Soc. Accountability Intl., SAI Governance Structure, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction =
Page.viewPage&pageld=594&parentlD=472 (accessed July 23, 2006).
185. Soc. Accountability Intl., Overview of SA8000, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page
.viewPage&pageld=473 (accessed July 23, 2006).
186. Id.
187. Soc. Accountability Intl., About Us, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&
PagelD=472&C\ CFusionMX7\verity\Data\dummy.txt (accessed July 23, 2006). The website states, id:
SAI works with companies (such as the Gap, Inc., Co-op Italia, and Chiquita Brands International),
consumer groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs like Amnesty International and
C.A.R.E.), labor organizations (which currently include a total of 15 million workers in their ranks),
governmental agencies, and certification bodies around the world. SAI accredits the certification
bodies for SA8000 auditing to ensure that workers receive the just and humane treatment
they deserve.
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Round Table, "an international network of principled business leaders working to
promote a moral capitalism. The [Caux Round Table] advocates implementation of [its]
Principles for Business through which principled capitalism can flourish and sustainable
and socially responsible prosperity can become the foundation for a fair, free and
188
transparent global society."
The voluntary regulation movement is important for a number of reasons unrelated
to self-regulation. But in the context of my discussion, this movement strongly suggests
that self-regulating behaviors can succeed without a significant social and political
foundation. Recent scholarship has begun to suggest that a transnational class has been
emerging that not only drives the shape and speed of globalization, but also manages
globalization instrumentally through the transnational corporation.189 Leslie Sklair
attempt[s] to show how a new class is emerging and how it pursues people and resources
all over the world in its insatiable desire for private profit and eternal accumulation.
This new class is the transnational capitalist class, composed of corporate executives,
globalizing
bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing professionals, and consumerist
90
elites.
Much of the analytical framework is grounded in a sophisticated reworking of
traditional Marxist-Leninist critiques of its arch-nemesis--capitalism.191 But that stance
ought not to blind those skeptical to the value of Marxist-Leninism as ideology to the
utility of the important insight of the rise of international networks of economic,
political, and cultural elites who together can serve to provide a necessary protection for
economic entities against the reach of the regulation of any one state. Building on the
work of Pierre Bourdieu, 192 Sklair is right to conclude that the autonomy of
multinational economic entities-what he characterizes as global capitalism--"is
augmented with ownership and control of other types of capital, notably political,
93
organizational, cultural, and knowledge capital."'
Of course, significantly more empirical research is necessary to explore the
contours of this new global class of individual actors connected through dense webs of
economic, political, public, private, educational, and other institutional ties. But even the
preliminary glance offered through this article suggests some important connections
reinforcing enterprise autonomy. Thus, for example,

188. Caux Round Table, About Us, http://www.cauxroundtable.org/about.html (accessed July 23, 2006).
189. See Leslie Sklair, The Sociology of the Global System (2d ed., Johns Hopkins U. Press 1995).
"The building blocks of [global system] theory are the TNCs, the characteristic institutional form of economic
transnational practices, the transnational capitalist class in the political sphere and in the culture-ideology
sphere, the culture-ideology of consumerism." Leslie Sklair, The TransnationalCapitalistClass 4 (Blackwell
Publg. 2001) [hereinafter Sklair, Capitalist Class].
190. Sklair, CapitalistClass, supra n. 189, at 4.
191. For a discussion of the Marxist-Leninist variant of this argument in the context of sovereign debt and its
relationship to non-Marxist-Leninist anti-globalization stances, see Larry Catd Backer, Ideologies of
Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and the IMF, 24 Pa. St. Intl. L. Rev. 497 (2006); see also R.J. Barry
Jones, Globalisationand Interdependence in the InternationalPolitical Economy: Rhetoric and Reality 23-30
(Printer Publishers 1995).
192. Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power (Lauretta C. Clough trans.,
Stanford U. Press 1996).
193. Sklair, Capitalist Class, supra n. 189, at 17 (citation omitted); see also J. Glassman, State Power
beyond the "Territorial Trap": The Internationalizationof the State, 18 Pol. Geography 669-99 (1999).
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[t]he Caux Round Table was founded in 1986 by Frederick Phillips, former President of
Philips Electronics and Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, former Vice-Chairman of INSEAD
[business school of management], as a means of reducing escalating trade tensions.
At the urging of Ryuzaburo Kaku, then Chairman of Canon, Inc., the [Caux Round Table]
began focusing attention on the importance of global corporate responsibility in reducing
social and economic threats to world peace and stability.

Olivier Giscard D'Estaing, in turn, is a founding member of the World Future
Council Initiative, 195 whose leadership includes members of a global economic and
political elite, 196 the goal of which is "to challenge the short-term commercial thinking
that currently has veto power over global decision-making." 197 Social Accountability
International's SA8000 standard is implemented in coordination with a global web of
consultants to industry.t 98 The secretariat of the Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights organization includes the International Business Leaders Forum and the
The former "works with business,
Business for Social Responsibility ("BSR").
governments, international agencies and other stakeholders to create new partnerships
that help both business and communities to flourish."1 9 9
The latter "acts as a trusted intermediary between business and civil society.
While understanding business and serving its needs, BSR maintains strong relationships0
sectors." 20
with other key stakeholders and opinion formers in the civic and public
Quite like Sklair's thesis, BSR also explains that it
is part of a growing global network of national organizations that promote awareness of
[Corporate Social Responsibility ("CSR")] and provide business leaders with opportunities
to collaborate and network with innovative managers across all industries, geographies and

194. Caux Round Table, Founding, http://www.cauxroundtable.org/history.htm (accessed July 23, 2006).
195. The founding Councilors represented the business, political, and academic elite from the Middle East,
Africa, South Asia, and Europe, and included Hafsat Abiola, Ibrahim Abouleish, Hans Peter Drr, Nicholas
Dunlop, HRH Prince El Hassan Bin Talal, Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, Bianca Jagger, Manfred Max-Neef,
Frances Moore-Lappe, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Anita Roddick, Hermann Scheer, Vandana Shiva, Sulak
World Future Council Initiative, Founding Councilors, http://
Sivaraksa, and Beate Weber.
www.worldfuturecouncil.org/founding-councilors.htm (accessed July 23, 2006).
196. World Future Council Initiative, Values, Visions, Solutions, http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/
index.htm (accessed July 23, 2006).
197. World Future Council Initiative, Introduction, http://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/index.htm (accessed
July 23, 2006).
198. See Soc. Accountability Intl., SA8000 Consultants, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Page.viewPage&pageld=601&parentlD-473 (accessed July 23, 2006) (listing thirteen global consultants "who
have had training in the use of SA8000 and experience on advising companies on SA8000 implementation").
199. Intl. Bus. Leaders Forum, About Us, http://www.iblf.org/about us.jsp (accessed Sept. 18, 2006).
The International Business Leaders Forum "was formed in 1990 by The Prince of Wales as an international,
business-led, not-for-profit membership organisation focused on responsible business and development."
The Prince of Wales, The Prince's Charities: IBLF, http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/trusts/busforum.html
(accessed September 18, 2006). The Prince of Wales is president of a large multinational not-for-profit
enterprise consisting of a group of charities.
14 of the 16 Charities were founded personally by The Prince. The group is the largest multi-cause
charitable enterprise in the United Kingdom, raising over £ 100 million annually. The organisations
are active across a broad range of areas including opportunity and enterprise, education, health, the
built environment, responsible business, the natural environment and the arts.
The Prince of Wales, The Prince's Charities, http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/trusts/index.html (accessed
Sept. 18, 2006).
200. Bus. for Soc. Resp., About BSR, http://www.bsr.org/Meta/About/index.cfm (accessed July 23, 2006).
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functions. BSR also works collaboratively with numerous other CSR, corporate
citizenship and sustainability organizations throughout the world, such as Business in the
Community in the U.K., the Council for Better Corporate Citizenship in Japan,
CSR-Europe, Accion Empresarial in Chile, Instituto Ethos in Brazil, and MAALA in
Israel. BSR 20
is 1a founding member of EMPRESA, a network of CSR organizations in
the Americas.
An international network of state and non-state actors, creating ever more complex webs
of regulatory mechanisms in which the territorial state is just another (though quite
important) actor, reinforces the idea of enterprise autonomy-the growing reality of
enterprises now in control of their assets, freed of their owners, and freed from any one
set of regulations. It is the autonomous enterprise, rather than capital, labor, or the state,
that now defines itself with reference to those stakeholders. A nexus of contract, but one
in which the autonomous enterprise now plays a role every bit as important as the other
stakeholders traditionally considered the sum of its parts.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This article introduces the construction of a theory of institutional autonomy from
a century of debate about the nature of economic entities. The article first re-examined
the asset partitioning ideas of Hansmann and Kraakman in the context of the
multinational enterprise. It suggested that asset partitioning can be usefully understood
as fleshing out the contours of the way in which organizational law shapes enterprise
autonomy for creditors. The article then re-examined the corporate personality analysis
of Iwai suggesting the possibility of enterprise autonomy from shareholders in a global
context. The article then considered the perverse utility of the ancient territorial
principle and the principle of regulatory hierarchy in the global context to suggest the
possibility of enterprise autonomy from the state. Putting these three puzzle pieces
together, the article concludes that the nexus of multinational enterprises and
globalization provides a foundation for the emergence of self-conscious, autonomous,
self-regulating economic enterprises.
Asset partitioning has made possible the organization of enterprises whose assets
are autonomous of shareholders and reside in the enterprise. Realist capitalism has made
it possible to organize corporations whose governance is autonomous of shareholders.
With assets and governance vested in an organization independent of the individual
stakeholders, the enterprise is subject only to the direct regulation of the state.
Globalization has made the autonomous and self-regulating enterprise possible by
reducing the power of state regulation of the entity. Enterprises freed of shareholder
control and the nexus point of enterprise debt that can disperse regulatory control
will have effectively achieved self-regulation. From an institutional perspective, the
enterprise will have achieved a status that begins to resemble that of the state.
The current consequences of the rise of the self-regulating enterprise are already
being felt in at least two respects. The first is evidenced by the growing movement for
such enterprises to form regulatory communities. The rise of voluntary codes of conduct
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and other similar mechanisms of behavior regulation attest to the growing power of
enterprises to free themselves from the regulation of states. The second is evidenced by
the efforts of international political communities to attempt to substitute a global legal
regulatory order for that of the states. The international community has already
confronted the reality of a global economy in which autonomous, self-regulating entities
wield enormous authority. The United Nation's human rights institutions have sought to
impose an international legal regime on the regi'lation of enterprises whose asset and
control dispersions (by distribution of capital and control on a worldwide basis through a
controlled group of subsidiary enterprises) transcend national boundaries to the detriment
of states and their citizens. These efforts have been unsuccessful. Diversification of
debt permitted enterprises a certain independence from their creditors. Asset partitioning
permitted enterprises to consolidate an institutional presence. Diversification of
shareholding augmented the institutional power of the enterprise (and its managers) as
against owners. That diversification permitted a certain (and sometimes almost
complete) autonomy of enterprises from their owners. The dispersion of regulatory
power among a number of states, like the dispersion of ownership, continues the process
of enterprise institutional augmentation. That dispersion of regulatory power will
significantly reduce the regulatory power of states and increase the autonomy of entities.
The extent of the regulatory autonomy of enterprises will continue to be a
significant issue.
This question in the twenty-first century is very different from that in the
nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Today an economic enterprise can insulate its assets
within itself. It can disperse its assets among enterprises--each an independent juridical
person. It can exist independent of its shareholders. It can own itself. It can exist
independent of the regulation of any singular political community. It can choose the set
of regulations to which it wishes to subject clusters of assets. It can regulate itself.
For the economic enterprise able to disperse assets and operations worldwide and access
capital markets around the globe, the essential role of law of the economic organization
appears to be to enhance the ability of the multinational economic enterprise to become
an autonomous and self-regulating enterprise.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005

31

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 41 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 8
TULSA LA W REVIEW

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss3/8

[Vol. 41:541

32

